Linked Crises?

This popularity of Sonko and his party can partially be explained because many young adults, such as Youssouph and others on the street, see Sonko as a way to establish this dialogue between the Casamance and the national government in Dakar as mentioned in the previous chapter. Having Sonko in a high government position makes many hopeful that the Casamance will no longer be the marginalised region it is in their eyes, both politically and economically.

When looking at the social activity in 2024, it is possible to draw parallels between this unrest and the anti-government protests which occurred in 1982. As could be seen in the previous chapter, most of the participants who were local to the region claim that they have moved on from the Casamance Conflict, referring to it as something from the past and the business of their parents and grandparents. However, the memory still remains within these individuals as many, such as Issa and Chérif, refer to specific events or years during which violence occurred. Even though during these interviews, the participants were not explicit in referring to the people from whom they got these memories, it can be argued that they have been transferred from their parents or caregivers who have lived through these events, thus keeping them alive. Eichelsheim, et al. (2019) also argue that it is important to explore the transmission of legacy. Whereas with the newcomers, it appears that “silencing” was a more common factor, the locals are very aware of what happened and are willing to express themselves about the past. However, in previous research by  Berckmoes, et al. (2017), it remains inconclusive whether or not the transmission of these experiences contributes to the continuation of violence in Rwanda, I would argue that it did contribute in the case of Ziguinchor. 

This was not the first time such movements have happened regarding Sonko’s role in national politics as similar protests happened during the summer of 2023.  These protests were organised as a reaction to the arrest of Sonko in May the same year. Sonko was sentenced to two years in prison by the Court of Dakar, being convicted of corrupting the youth. Sonko’s supporters barricaded the main roads around his house in the Néma neighbourhood to prevent the authorities from passing through, resulting in clashes between Sonko’s supporters and the police (Toure, 2023). These clashes and barricades would spread to the surrounding neighbourhoods Grand Dakar, Santhiaba, Castor and Lyndiane, leaving at least two dead (Kouyaté, 2023). These neighbourhoods have also been hotspots during the 2024 unrest. During the 2023 protests, the people on the street also protested in support of Sonko because they saw him as a hopeful change for Senegal’s youth, giving them better economic and political opportunities (AFP, 2023). The 2023 protests left a total of 23 people dead in Senegal, with six of the deaths occurring in Ziguinchor (Ngom, 2023). AFP (2023) also reports that during these protests, women belonging to the Diola Sacred Forest on the border of Ziguinchor, reported to have magic powers, were also chanting and dancing in front of Sonko’s house in order to protect him. Out of personal observations, this occurred as well during the 2024 protest.

It can be argued that the events in the summer of 2023 and in February 2024 are part of the same social crisis given the significant similarities in the context and events which unfolded. The parallels between the two series of protests are evident, with them happening in the same neighbourhoods and both of the events happening following political decisions negatively affecting Ousmane Sonko and his ideas. It can even be argued that the events in February 2024 are a second round of the events of the previous summer, with two periods of significant violence separated by months of relative peace, showing a more cyclical nature to the violence as well. Vigh (2008) argues that a crisis also can become context as the emergence of a crisis can often be qualified as a sense of “loss”, whether it be a loss of security, stability or clarity. In this case, both of these protests concerned Ziguinchor’s mayor, Sonko, and threats to his personal security in relation to the government, leading to social mobilisation of Ziguinchor’s youth. 

When comparing the events in 2023-2024 and 1982, there are similarities as well. These protests can find their origin in the dissatisfaction of the local population, who feel that they are being marginalised by the government. During the interviews, it became apparent that many young adults in Ziguinchor still feel similarly to the young generation in 1982, often saying that little has changed. These protests all mostly involved young men but still had important roles for the women as well, either leading the protest as a sign of peace in 1982 or providing spiritual support in 2023 and 2024. There is still a contrast between the two periods of protest, with the 1982 protest being a more general protest against the government whereas the 2023-2024 protests were aimed around Ousmane Sonko, in which many have put their hopes for recognition and an improved quality of life in the Casamance. It should be noted however that both periods of social unrest had a violent reaction from the authorities, with 1982 leading to the death of a significant number of protesters (Ngom & Sene, n.d.), as well as the death of at least 6 protesters in 2023 and one in 2024, with evidence that at least during the 2024 protests, the police forces used military calibre ammunition against the civilians, as can be seen in the video posted in this chapter or the image below. 

Image sent in by anonymous participant.

English text superimposed on the original to provide context.

 In this case, both of these protests concerned Ziguinchor’s mayor, Sonko, and threats to his personal security in relation to the government, leading to the social mobilisation of Ziguinchor’s youth. During both events, the young adults of Ziguinchor mobilised themselves in a semi-organised way in order to express support of Sonko due to their hope that he will be able to positively change their lives, both for the region and for their generation on a national level. This mobilisation can also be analysed using the dimension of constrained agency from de Bruijn & Both (2018), with young adults organising themselves in groups in order to express their disapproval of the government’s actions and support for their regional leader. These actions can be compared to similar events which occurred in late 1999 in Ivory Coast, as explained by Arnaut (2005). In December 1999, a coup in Ivory Coast occurred, also known as the “coup d’état des jeunes”, the coup of the youngsters, which occurred due to the feeling that many youths, especially students in Ivory Coast felt marginalised by the government due to street violence and power cuts across the country. Although the youth in Senegal did not reach the extent of organising a coup, their actions did put significant pressure on the government to release Ousmane Sonko and eventually allow the PASTEF to win the elections.

 During this period in Ivory Coast, two broad opinions circulated during students meetings in the country, the first of which is that the power cuts showed the pauperization of the academic elite, turning them into a sort of proletariat, and a second group who thought that the power cuts and increasing violence were a symbol of the failure of the government to cope with the economic recession which started in the 1980s (Arnaut, 2005). When power cuts happened in 2024 in Ziguinchor, people had similar negative reactions, such as Landing who referred to the power cuts as deliberate and the shutdown of mobile data as a criminal act which harmed the citizens of Senegal and further fuelled their dissatisfaction with Macky Sall’s government. The idea of a proletarianisation of students can also be seen during these interviews, with Landing and Limane having graduated from university but who are running a small store, as well as Arfang and Assane, who have also attended university but not graduated and who are working respectively as a market vendor and Jakarta driver. Additionally, as can be seen by the map of Ziguinchor during this period of unrest, a significant amount of social activity against the government was organised around the Assane Seck University in the southwest of Ziguinchor, with major student involvement, as can be seen by the accounts of Bassirou.