The Casamance conflict seen through the eyes of the generation born in it.

Image: Senegalese military convoy heading towards Bignona

Vehicles include off-road vehicles and South African-made PUMA M26-15 armoured personnel carriers

Many of the young men born in the region have a different view of the conflict than those who arrived in Ziguinchor at a later date, creating different narratives about the conflict. These are some accounts of how the conflict is seen from different perspectives and how they might apply to the concept of crisis.

Click on the portraits to read the interviews with these men or scroll through to the analysis.

Through local eyes

Street interview with Landing, Limane and Filal about the current state of the crisis

Assane & Issa about conflict factors

Youssouph about the MFDC

Market talk with Chérif about current politics in relation to the conflict

Bassirou on Ziguinchor’s outskirts

Additional pictures included

Ibrahim on regional identity

Newcomer perspectives

Arfang about arriving and acceptance

Malick about making a living

Jean about keeping order and the role of the police

Analysis

As can be seen through these experiences and memories, there are two broad narratives concerning the conflict which can be generally separated between the perception of the conflict of those local to the region and those who arrived at a later point in their lives. 

It can be seen that the men who have grown up on the Casamance, whether they are Jola’s or not, have a different attitude towards the conflict compared to the men who moved to the region at a later point in their lives. Personal ways to discuss the conflict might differ depending on the person. Evans (2021) mentions that many of the people who were displaced during the conflict are reluctant to talk about their displacement to urban areas such as Ziguinchor or the conflict itself. This reluctance can be explained due to the fact that people have moved on in their lives since their displacement from their villages, leaving the younger generations to initiate the return process to the villages of their families.

However, as Evans (2014) also says, some youths are reluctant to return to their family’s villages and leaving behind the urban life and its amenities. This example can also apply to Bassirou and his family, with Bassirou saying that it was not his role to talk about his family’s experiences because he hasn’t lived through them and preferring to leave the region in order to go to Dakar or abroad as he considers his chances better over there compared to staying in the Casamance. The idea that Bassirou does not feel like he should talk about the conflict but that he refers to his aunt instead, who experienced the conflict before he was born, is an interesting observation. This may be explained through the work of Eichelsheim, Berckmoes, Holá, Rutayisire & Richters (2019), whose work aimed to explore how the legacies of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its aftermath have been transmitted to the next generation within Rwandan families through the concept of “silencing”. Many Rwandan mothers who participated in this research were hesitant to share their experiences during the genocide and its aftermath. This hesitance primarily originated through the concerns that it would keep the past alive and that these women have moved on from the events themselves, saying that the genocide and its aftermath are history (Eichelsheim, et al., 2019). Although I unfortunately did not get the opportunity to ask Bassirou’s aunt about this, a similar attitude might exist among the older generation. This can be further reinforced with Bassirou’s comments that there are, allegedly, still active or former rebels living in the neighbourhood as well and waiting to avoid bringing up past events. 

This silence about the conflict can also be seen through the work of de Bruijn & Both (2018), using the concept of duress through the normalisation of hardship and constrained agency. In their work, de Bruijn & Both (2018) illustrate how chronic hardships, such as everyday violence and oppression but most notably in this case, the memory of past violence, can lead to its integration into everday life of an individual and contribute to the determination of an individual’s everyday life. It is possible that this manifests itself through constrained agency in the form of self-censorship, as people keep their experiences for themselves to avoid bringing up the past (de Bruijn & Both, 2018). This would refer back to the work of Eichelsheim, et al., (2019), where people prefer to stay silent in order to avoid keeping the past alive. 

During the conversations with Limane and his companions, Landing and Filal, it was interesting to see that the three men almost made a joke out of the current state of the conflict, often laughing while discussing it or referring to the rebels as nothing more than bandits at this point. This is also an interesting point that Vigh (2008) encountered in his research, in which it is argued that the young adults in Bissau “normalise” the crisis in which they find themselves and that the crisis becomes their frame of action. It should be said that this normalisation is not the same as indifference, as many do not agree with the way that things are and realise that things need to change in order for their own lives to improve.

Others, such as Chérif and Ibrahim, who see the conflict more as a struggle throughout history and who support the idea of an independent Casamance to a certain extent, still distance themselves from the current actions of the MFDC, having a stronger emphasis on a dialogue between the parties involved in the conflict. This struggle throughout history is also an interesting example of de Bruin & Both’s (2018) notion of durée and can be further explained by looking at the region’s history. Additionally, one of the mototaxi/”Jakarta” drivers, Filal, said that the generation to which his friends and himself belong have been raised by their parents and community as Senegalese citizens and consciously not as Casamançais. This can also break cycles of violence and explains why such a strong emphasis is put on putting the conflict to an end through dialogue instead of violence. As Berckmoes, de Jong & Reis (2017) demonstrated based on their research among parents and their children in Burundi, a country which has experienced cyclical violence as well, that positive caregiving to a child can help to break cycles of violence. An interesting observation in this study is that during adolescence, corporal discipline is no longer seen as effective between a caregiver and a child and intergenerational dialogue is expected in order to solve conflict. Although in the scope of the research of Berckmoes et al (2017), this observation focused more on inter-personal conflict, I would argue that this type of positive caregiving and educating, such as raising their children by telling them that they are Senegalese and not Casamançais, also helps to perceive the conflict differently by knowing that repeating cycles of violence will not resolve the ongoing struggles and preferring to use dialogue instead in the case of the Casamance. It is clear that these men do not see the fight for an independent Casamance as their fight and prefer to look forward, letting the conflict fall to the background of their daily lives and thus making it a “normality”.

However, in contrast to this normalisation, others such as Limane think that the conflict is still ongoing in a more articificial way that favours the parties fighting in it. This can be seen from two sides, first that having an artificial conflict may appear as a somewhat absurd concept, which can be seen as the opposite of normalisation or on the contrary, it can be seen as a great example of  normalisation as people do not know how to bring it to an end or might even profit from keeping it ongoing.

This normality is two-fold, first in the way that the Casamance crisis is “normal” and thus falls more into the background of the lives of these young men. This can be seen in the way that many of the participants refer to the conflict as an event that was started by the generations before them and that they do not associate themselves with it. This is a “normal” state as these individuals have been born into it. However, “normality” also has a qualitative application according to Vigh (2008), which also applies to the individuals in this research. Vigh (2008) argues that “normality” can also refer to how things should be or how we like them to be. This idea of normality also applies to the men in Ziguinchor, as all of them have their own specific ideas on how to end the crisis. Most think that they are being marginalised by the government of Senegal and think that through dialogue and development, there could be an end to the hostilities. These are their ideas of achieving a state of non-conflict “normality” in the region for lasting peace.

The concept of duress as explored by de Bruijn & Both (2018) can also be applied by how these men perceive the conflict, using the second concept explained in their article, the normalisation of hardships. In their article, de Bruijn & Both (2018) argue that hardships such as oppression, the memories of previous violence, the threat of war or everyday violence can lead to the internalisation of these, often chronic, hardships, and making them fall more towards the background of everyday life. In the case of Ziguinchor and the people interviewed for this research, this can be seen in the somewhat dismissive attitude of some of the participants, laughing the conflict away but still feeling like they are being treated unfairly by the Senegalese government. 

Even though the sample of men who are not local to the region is smaller in this research, it is still interesting to see that the views and opinions of these three men can also be grouped togethe. All three of these men have moved to Ziguinchor for work-related reasons, whether it was a transfer or in search of better opportunities. They might have had doubts about going to the Casamance based on stories they had heard before but all three appreciated the region and Ziguinchor more once they finally arrived. Even then, these men avoid travelling through the areas that potentially host rebels, preferring to take a detour if necessary. Most interestingly, these men did not see it as their role to discuss the conflict, noting that it is an issue for those who are local to the region, or just refuse to discuss it all together. This general avoidance to talk about the topic can also be seen as a way to bury the past and leave it behind, as explained by Eichelsheim et al. (2019). Additionally, this supposed self-censorship has been transmitted from their families, as the individuals who are new to the region came here with concerns which they had received from their previous social and familial environments. This shows that there is might still be a gap between the locals and newcomers in terms of regional politics and that even though the local Casamançais might have been raised as citizens of Senegal, they might still keep a distinct identity from those in the country’s other regions. 

Even though this smaller sample was less open to have a discussion about the conflict, I still argue that it is also a normal, albeit more indirect part of their lives as it does influence their choices, such as their decisions to avoid travelling to regions rumoured to house rebels. This can also be seen as a social crisis according to Vigh (2008), as it affects the lives and movements of these men. The idea of a social crisis can be even further built upon, as some of the participants think that the cause of the continuation of the conflict lies with the government in Dakar, such as Youssouph and Assane, who believe that having a conflict in the region works in the benefit of the government. This supposed benefit for the government originates in keeping the region mariginalised and delegitimising its identity in order to exploit its resources according to these men.

However, Galvan (2001) says that ethnic power-sharing is an unwritten norm in Senegal, with the dominant Wolof group holding most positions of power but that other ethnic groups have been fairly represented in Senegalese politics and society. This balance has been carefully constructed under Senghor, Senegal’s first president, to work as a bridge between different communities and socio-economic backgrounds to support Senegal as a whole instead of creating gaps between communities. The use of Islamic Sufi brotherhoods, which are open to people from any background, helps to reinforce this collective identity, although these brotherhoods are not as strong in the Casamance, albeit still present, where more people follow traditional animist beliefs as well (Galvan, 2001). Political parties aiming to push the interests of a specific ethnic group are also banned in Senegalese politics, and after the escalation of violence in 1990, the Senegalese government claimed that the MFDC aimed to start a “Diola republic” in parts of Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. This has been seen as an effort to delegitimise the MFDC and their political goals (Lambert, 1998). These claims have also been rejected by the people living in the Casamance, such as Issa and Ibrahim in this research. Lambert (1998) states that many in Senegal also acknowledged that the Casamance has a distinct identity in Senegalese society, although this does not mean that they are different or incompatible. As Chérif said in this research, some may wish for more autonomy or a federal system to still remain with Senegal but having more power over their own decisions in the region as sort of middle ground between independence and integrating into the rest of Senegal. 

  According to Vigh (2008), this can also be seen as a part of a social crisis as many results of large-scale global processes, or in this case national, are indifferent to the effects it has on the lives of those on who these decisions land. This is due to the distance at which these decisions are made from the places where they are actually implemented, which is in this case the Senegalese government in Dakar and the relatively isolated region of Ziguinchor on the border of Senegal.

Even though many of the men interviewed for this research see the Casamance Conflict as a crisis that has been normalised and has become an event in the background of their daily lives, thus having a more passive attitude towards the conflict, the next chapter will analyse how these participants and their peers can have a more active role during times of crisis.

Bibliography

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Eichelsheim, V., Hola, B., Berckmoes, L., Rutayisire, T., & Richters, A. (2018). Before my time? Addressing the intergenerational legacies of the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Intervention, 17(1), 31. https://doi.org/10.4103/1571-8883.239711

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Galvan, D. (2001). Democracy without ethnic conflict: embedded parties, transcendent social capital & non-violent pluralism in Senegal and Indonesia (pp. 1-22). De auteur.

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Vigh, H. (2008). Crisis and Chronicity: Anthropological perspectives on continuous conflict and decline. Ethnos, 73(1), 5–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/00141840801927509